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ABSTRACT
This thesis evaluates the forecasting accuracy of the
Structured Accession Planning system for Officers (STRAP-O)
model. The vehicle for this examination is the implementation
plan for the Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) program. An
important policy question to be addressed is whether the ACP
bonus program will increase the continuation rate of mid-grade
aviators sufficiently to fulfill department head requirements
in the mid 90's? The design of the STRAP-O system and its
components are explained and a synopsis of the ACP program is
included. The methodology used for determining the accuracy
of the STRAP-O model is outlined, as well as the results
obtained by running STRAP-O. These results are compared to
the results of a CNA study on the ACP program and to the
actual number of ACP recipients in 1989. In addition,
suggestions are made to assist in the creation of a personal
computer version of the STRAP-O model that will replace the
current mainframe version. Accesion For
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With the massive changes that will take place in the
military manpower system during the 1990's, strategic planning
is assuming increased importance. However, because the Navy
must answer to Congress on a daily basis, tactical (current)
issues take up the majority of staff efforts in the Navy
manpower planning community. Focusing solely on current
issues can create serious future problems if the long-term
implications of short-term policy decisions are not
considered.
Putting out the daily "fires" is the major focus of
planners in the office of the Assistant Chief of Naval
Personnel for Military Personnel Policy and Career Progression
(PERS-2). What is needed is a tool that not only assists in
tactical manpower planning, but that also forecasts this
tactical plan forward and projects the strategic, long-term
implications. If possible, this capability should be combined
in a single model.
Being blind to potential future "fires" that are created
by current policies may perpetuate the need for last-minute
"damage control." The ability to forecast personnel behavior
due to changing manpower policies or fluctuations in civilian
1
economic conditions eases the job of the manpower planner by
providing some early indications of potential problems.
B. OBJECTIVE
The tactical problem to be addressed in this thesis is the
shortage of mid-grade aviators which is expected to occur in
the early 1990's. This thesis unsuccessfully attempted to
analyze a proposed solution to this problem. The Structured
Accession Planning System for Officers (STRAP-O) model was
used to forecast the retention effects of a new, increased
bonus program called the Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) bonus
program. The ACP bonus program was instituted in 1989.
This analysis was originally attempted in a CNA study by
Donald J. Cymrot, entitled "Implementation of the Aviation
Continuation Pay (ACP) program" [Ref. 4]. The results of the
CNA study indicated that shortages of mid-grade aviators would
remain even if the ACP bonus program was established. On the
other hand, the analysis in this thesis indicated that most
shortages could be overcome with the ACP bonus program. The
results from the first 3 years of the ACP bonus program
support the CNA conclusions.
Chapter II of this thesis provides an overview of the
STRAP-O model. Chapter III provides an overview of Cymrot's
original evaluation of the Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP)
program, and summarizes his results. Chapter IV outlines the
methodology of this thesis and compares the results of this
thesis to those of Cymrot. The conclusions of this thesis are
2
presented in Chapter V. Recommendations for the current
upgrade and creation of a PC-based version of the STRAP-O
model are offered.
Among the issues this thesis proposes to address is the
following especially important issue. Although STRAP-O was
designed as a strategic planning tool, an important question
is whether it can also be used tactically. That is, can
STRAP-O be modified to solve short-term problems? If STRAP-O
can either be modified, or "tricked," into a short-term mode,
then PERS-2 manpower planners would have a tool to help them
put out "fires" today and, at the same time, make forecasts of
the long-term ramifications of different short term scenarios.
This would assist manpower planners in stabilizing manpower
policies and obviate the need for last minute, crisis manage-
ment.
A stable manpower system positively impacts readiness and
reduces the total cost of manning the Navy. For example, a
stable system smoothes the training process because the true
training requirements will be accurately known. As people
flow through the system more evenly with fewer year group re-
assignments, uncertainty in the promotion system is lessened.
This should increase morale and lead to higher retention.
Higher retention means lower training requirements, which
reduces training outlays. Higher retention also means a more
experienced force, which makes fewer mistakes in the form of
3
crashed aircraft and damaged ships. All of these will provide
potentially significant savings to the Navy.
4
II. THE STRAF-O MODEL BACKGROUND
A. OFFICER PLANNING PROCESS OVERVIEW
Officer manpower plans in the Navy are developed for
individual communities (Surface Warfare, Aviation, etc.).
These separate community plans are passed from the officer
community managers to the total officer strength planner who
compiles each individual plan to make the total Navy plan.
This plan is then sent to PERS-2 (Headed by a one star
admiral) for approval. The plan is then forwarded to the
Chief of Naval PERSonnel (a three star admiral) and to the
various resource sponsors (Surface Warfare, Aviation, etc.)
for review. The plan is then sent back down to the officer
for any community managers modifications based on this review.
This process is repeated until all the separate plans add
together into a coherent workable all-Navy plan. This
iteration process is both time-consuming and cumbersome.
B. NAVY OFFICER PERSONNEL PLANNING SYSTEM (NOPPS)
The total Navy plan is compiled using the Navy Officer
Personnel Planning System (NOPPS). NOPPS is used by the
Officer Plans and Career Management Branch (PERS-21) to
develop the overall strength plan, monitor the strength plan
execution, and respond to strength queries from outside
sources. NOPPS calculates average strengths and predicts end
strength for the current, budget and FYDP (Future Years
5
Defense Plan) years. NOPPS does not have a sophisticated
method of forecasting. The loss rates used by NOPPS are
strictly historical and forecasts are done in a naive fashion.
NOPPS also provides a means of creating and analyzing officer
strength plans and computes DOPMA grade ceilings. Sitilar to
a large spreadsheet program, NOPPS is used to gather and store
the large amounts of information used in preparing the officer
strength and budget plans. [Ref. 5:p. 5-1]
NOPPS is a collection of menu-driven systems written in
APL and run on a personal computer. All of the information
contained within NOPPS is reconciled each month for accuracy
with the Officer Master File to keep actual inventory levels
current. [Ref. 5:p. 5-1]
C. STRUCTURED ACCESSION PLANNING SYSTEM FOR OFFICERS
(STRAP-O)
The Structured Accession Planning System for Officers
(STRAP-O) is a set of linked, mainframe computer models. The
purpose of these models is to assist the Navy in strategic
manpower planning. An initial version of STRAP-O, which deals
only with the Unrestricted Line (URL) communities, was
installed at the office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Opera-
tions (PERS-2) in September 1981. A total force version,
which included all Navy Officers, came on line in March 1982.
The latest version has been modified several times, with the
most notable change the addition of a "user-friendly" inter-
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face that prompts the user for inputs and automatically
manages the data base.
The idea and focus of STRAP-O is to answer "what if"
questions concerning manpower policies and plans by community,
as well as questions about how the communities interact in
creating the total Navy plan. The total Navy plan includes
all of the community-specific needs as well as training
requirements, personnel throughput, and support billets.
STRAP-O determines if these manpower policies and community
plans are feasible by forecasting seven years into the future
the annual stocks of personnel by community, length of service
(LOS), and pay grade. It also gives the stocks for the
intervening years and can, on request, forecast out to 100
years in the future to display the "steady state" force
structure.
STRAP-O can determine if and how desired force levels can
be reached. This is done using expected or mandated rates of
attrition and promotion. At the same time, STRAP-O can
determine the number of accessions from each commissioning
source required to meet the intermediate stages of a desired
force end strength.
STRAP-O considers Defense Officer PERSonnel Management Act
(DOPMA) restrictions, promotion policies, pay-grade targets,
and manual overrides when developing a feasible plan. The
user can create an almost unlimited number of scenarios and
7
forecast the long-range implications of each. Some examples
of uses of the model are listed below:
1. A desired force end strength can be defined (as well as
the desired size and the time horizon for achieving the
goal), and based on this STRAP-O will determine required
accessions and promotion policies, given expected loss
rates;
2. Accession requirements can be defined and STRAP-O will
determine the future end strength;
3. STRAP-O will choose the appropriate promotion zones or
promotion opportunities for a given force structure.
Either of these can be given and the implications
forecasted. For example, will the specified policy
variables generate "choke points" or shortages in the
flow of personnel through the system?
4. STRAP-O can be used to forecast the effect of pay
changes on the loss rates in the different communities;
5. The best mix of officers from different accession
sources can be determined with STRAP-O by considering
the retention history of these various commissioning
sources.
The scenarios listed above are only a few of the possible
situations that can be examined through STRAP-O, alone or
sometimes in combination with each other.
D. DATA INPUTS
The starting data required by the STRAP-O system is the
stock of active duty Navy officers onboard at the beginning of
the fiscal year. These inventories are updated by the Navy
PERSonnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) from the
Navy Master Loss File once a year. STRAP-O also requires a
set of manpower requirements that describe the personnel
implications of alternative Navy missions. [Ref. l:p. 4]
STRAP-O can represent manpower requirements as "true"
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requirements where the end strength under consideration is
solved only for the billets authorized by DOPMA. These
requirements are supplied by the Navy Manpower System (NAMPS).
Requirements can also be determined as a function of an
"objective force." Objective force requirements are those
requirements that allow for steady manpower throughput, where
all communities receive their required number of personnel.
This is an "ideal" force structure that ignores legal and
budgetary personnel constraints.
Manpower requirements fall into two categories: 1)
structured spaces, and 2) unstructured spaces. Structured
spaces are operational and support billets--the jobs directly
associated with accomplishing Navy missions. Albo included in
this category are managerial billets (designators 1050s/1000s)
that can be filled by any officer, and billets that can only
be filled by an officer from a specific warfare community
(e.g., pilot). Unstructured spaces are the billets for
students, transients, and patients, which are not required in
the direct accomplishment of the Navy's missions.
The STRAP-O model automatically aggregates and apportions
these requirements and forms the goals that it seeks to
achieve [Ref. l:p. 4). The stocks of Navy personnel are
disaggregated into 31 communitiesi, 9 pay grades (01-06 with
three fail-select grades, 03F, 04F, and 05F), and 31 LOS
cells. This disaggregation generates 8,649 matrix elements
'Officer communities are listed in Appendix A.
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that must be determined. STRAP-O solves for all of these
elements simultaneously in determining the manpower configur-
ation needed to sustain desired personnel policies such as
consistent promotion flow points and opportunities.
E. STRAP-O SYSTEM OPERATION
The STRAP-O model is made up of four separate modules that
work in concert. Figure 1 shows these modules and how they
interact:
1. Officer Goals (OGOALS).
2. Accession Into Designators (AIDS).
3. Officer Force Projection Model (OPRO).
4. Officer Retention Forecasting Model (ORFM).
OGOALS is the "front-end" of the STRAP-O model and
provides AIDS and OPRO with a common set of strength goals.
OGOALS performs the following three-step process for the AIDS
module. First, the warfare-specific structured spaces are
divided into the various communities by experience level
(defined by contiguous length of service cells), the dimension
employed by AIDS. Then the remainder of the structured
spaces, the managerial billets, are allocated among the 31
specific communities and then converted as above. Finally,
the unstructured spaces (manpower overhead billets) are
determined as a function of the size and configuration of the
structured spaces and applied to each community.
If the user were to supply only total officer strength
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Figure 1. Flow diagram of the STRAP-O system components
portion of that force needed for overhead spaces and then
divide the remaining structured spaces among the various
communities. For OPRO, the OGOALS module produces total
strength and specific grade goals from the same requirements
set used for AxDS. This ensures that the solutions from both
the AIDS and OPRO modules are moving toward consistent targets
[Ref. l:p. 4]. The OGOALS targets supplied to AIDS and/or
OPRO can be defined by the user as true requirements or as
objective force requirements.
AIDS is a linear programming model that determines the
optimal number of officer accessions each year from each
commissioning source to achieve future force goals [Ref. l:p.
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2]. It has been observed that officers from different
commissioning sources and in different specialties display
different retention behaviors [Ref. l:p. 2]. These differing
behaviors will have different effects on the Navy's ability to
meet its needs. Commissioning programs also differ in other
ways important for planning purposes: cost, training capacity
(the number of personnel that can trained with a given set of
resources), and length of training [Ref. l:p. 3].
The AIDS module simultaneously considers all three of
these factors by community and for the total Navy. The
optimal mixes are considered and projected forward by the OPRO
module. AIDS can also be given priorities: for example,
requirements of the aviation and submarine community may be
deemed more important than those of the surface warfare
community.
The OPRO model forecasts personnel flow behavior of
officers as they are gained or lost to the system, promoted,
or "aged." By imposing management intentions concerning
accessions and promotion policy, and estimating the expected
losses, OPRO can forecast and summarize the personnel flows in
terms of continuation rates, which are then passed to AIDS
(Ref. l:p. 3].
The primary "engines" of STRAP-O, as they were initially
designed, are the AIDS and OPRO modules. In achieving a
desired force structure, these two modules can simultaneously
consider the accession, loss, and piomotion polices under
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consideration. Alternatively, each module can be run
separately. If OPRO and AIDS are run together, OPRO
determines losses, and promotes and ages the force; it then
sends this information to AIDS. AIDS, in turn, gives back
accession requirements. This is an iteration process that
continues until AIDS and OPRO are working as a system and a
steady throughput of personnel is attained. If OPRO is run
separately it assumes a set of manually input default values
for the number of accessions and simply ages the force. In
this way no modifications to accessions, up or down, are made
to adjust for shortfalls or surpluses in the flow of
personnel.
The mechanics of the OPRO model are those of a "naive"
model. 2  It takes the forecasted transition matrix and
projects the force forward. Promotion rates, lateral
transfers, and accession rates are input by the user and/or
AIDS. However, the last critical flow, loss rates, are
determined in the officer retention forecasting module (ORFM).
ORFM's purpose is to produce a set of loss rate forecasts
for each of the 31 STRAP-O communities over a 7-year time
horizon. (Ref. 5:p. 6) ORFM uses time-series techniques and
econometric methods to forecast future loss rates. Since
retention behavior for each sub-community is different with
2A naive model is one that forecasts strictly on the basis of
historical rates. No attempt is made to adjust the forecast rates
as a result of changes in economic or civilian employment condi-
tions or Navy policies.
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respect to changes in compensation, loss rates are calculated
independently for each sub-community. ORFM estimates the
changes in loss behavior that are expected to occur in each
specific community as a result of changes in compensation
policies. The model determines an officer's expected life-
stream earnings from the decision to remain in the military as
compared to the earnings stream that would result from a
decision to return to civilian life. By mathematically
relating the two earnings streams to the current and
historical loss rates, estimates of future loss rates can be
made, given the earnings streams implied by alternative
compensation policies. [Ref. l:p. 3]
ORFM uses two techniques to forecast loss rates: one is
a time-series projection, the other an econometric model. The
time-series technique involves historical weighting (HW) and
is non-behavioral. The behavioral, econometric model is a
cost-of-leaving (COL) model, and is a variant of the
annualized cost-of-leaving (ACOL) model, developed by Warner
and Goldberg (1979). The HW technique weights the actual
historical loss rates, using the data available, to determine
the forecast loss rate. The user can enter his own specific
weights with the only restriction being that they must sum to
one. With no user input, STRAP-O uses a default geometric
weighting scheme to determine the weights placed on the
individual years' historical loss rates. The weighting scheme
involves (1/2)i where i is the number of years between the
14
present and the past year. For example, to determine the
forecasted loss rate for a specific community for 1990 with
five years of historical data available, the equation is:
E1990= w1 (L 199) + w2 (L19) + w3 (L19 7) + w4 (L 19) + w5 (L 1 85 )
Where: 9 = Forecasted 1990 loss rate
L1989 = Actual 1989 loss rate
W, = Weight applied to the most recent actual for
loss rate
To make the weights sum to 1.0 a residual amount equal to
the weight of the last year (1985) must be distributed
across all five years' weights. In the above example
.0313 is divided by 5 and added to each weight.
Wizi.5 = (1/2)1 + ((1/2)5)/5 w, = .5000 + (.0313/5) = .5063
W2 = .2500 + (.0313/5) = .2563
w3 = .1250 + (.0313/5) = .1313
w4 = .0625 + (.0313/5) = .0688
W5 = .0313 + (.0313/5) = .0376
1.000
This weighted average historical loss rate is then
adjusted, by a logistic econometric COL model, for any
expected or projected real pay changes (pay is calculated net
of inflation). If no pay change is entered, then the model
assumes a cost of living increase equal to inflation to keep
the absolute difference between military and civilian pay
constant.
Once future loss rates are forecasted, they are subjected
to a "wear-off" function that brings the loss rate back to a
baseline rate. The individual historical loss rates for each
year form a cyclical pattern that fluctuates with the economy.
Loss rates are higher when the economy is strong, and lower
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when the economy is weak. From these cyclical loss rates, a
baseline loss rate is g.-erated. Currently, the baseline is
a simple unweighted average of all historical loss rates AOM
1969 to the present.
ORFM implements this wear-off function for two reasons.
The first reason is related to the increasing uncertainty over
time associated with the forecasts.
The second reason is associated with the "absolute pay"
hypothesis. Because uncertainty is relatively high, ORFM
employs a conservative strategy that forces its forecasts
toward a historical average.
Some of the more important variables that ultimately
determine the number of losses include civilian and military
pay and benefit levels, civilian unemployment rates, promotion
opportunities, and sea-shore rotation requirements. These
variables are difficult to forecast, and their influence on
loss behavior is difficult to estimate. Because of this, the
assumption that loss rates tend to some baseline average is
adopted.
The second reason a conservative strategy is employed
deals with the "absolute pay" hypothesis, which assumes that
military personnel are less concerned with their absolute
level of income than their income relative to their civilian
counterparts. Also, it is assumed that military personnel
expect a certain level of real growth in their incomes. This
belief is based primarily upon the recent history of real
16
income growth. If a growth rate in real income is not
sustained, loss rates will tend to rise even if the relative
level of income is held constant. [Ref. 5:p. 7]
The above are the reasons a wear-off function is employed.
The procedure to calculate the wear-off of loss rates for
forecast years 2 through 7 is as follows. For each Length of
Service (LOS) and Paygrade cell, a baseline loss rate is
calculated from the trend line of the historical data
available. The first year forecast is the weighted average of
the previous years' loss rates, adjusted for any pay changes,
as discussed above. At some point in years 2 through 7, the
loss rate forecast migrates to the baseline loss rate. The
speed at which the forecast rate returns to the baseline is
based on the coefficient of variation and the mean time
between "crossover" of the historical loss rates. The
coefficient of variation is determined by dividing the
standard deviation of the historical loss rates by their mean.
The larger the coefficient, the greater the volatility of the
loss rates, and the shorter the wear-off period [Ref. 5:p. 8].
The historical loss rates are cyclical, fluctuating
between a high and a low with respect to the baseline rate.
The mean time to crossover is calculated as the average time,
in years, between movements from below the baseline to above/
the baseline, or vice versa. This average is computed from
the historical data about crossovers. The shorter the mean
time to crossover the quicker the forecast loss rate returns
17
to the baseline, with the opposite also being true. (Ref.
5:p. 8]
F. KODEL VERIFICATION/VALIDATION
In 1986 NPRDC performed a verification of STRAP-O for a
five-year test period, FY81-85. The actual FY81-85 loss
rates, gains, and promotion policies were entered in order to
verify the mechanics of the model and to assess the fore-
casting errors it produced.
It was discovered that the model predicts accurately for
the total Navy and for each major community, but showed
substantial errors in the smaller sub-groups such as pilots,
Naval flight officers (NFO), and nurses. These errors were
attributed in part to the difficulty in modeling lateral
transfers, the policies for which change yearly. Year group
designations were also found to be inaccurate, in part because
they also changed regularly. Both of these factors accounted
for the inaccuracies in the smaller groups.
A validation was also performed for the FY81-85 test
period to ascertain STRAP-O's capability to forecast losses
and project inventories compared to the actual execution over
this time period. Six different loss forecasting method-
ologies were analyzed to determine which where the most
effective in forecasting personnel behavior:
1. Naive method with wear-off
2. Naive method without wear-off
3. Weighted method with wear-off
18
4. Weighted method without wear-off
5. ACOL with wear-off
6. ACOL without wear-off
For the ACOL method without wear-off, loss rates in the years
subsequent to the initial pay change are still increased or
decreased for additional pay changes.
The validation study indicated that the ACOL method
without the wear-off function proved best for the total URL
community, while the ACOL method with the wear-off function
minimized the forecasting inaccuracies for Restricted Line
(RL), Staff, and Limited Duty Officer (LDO) communities. It
was concluded that the ACOL method holds the greatest promise.
In general, any technique employing wear-off was superior to
those not using wear-off for RL/Staff/LDO communities. [Ref.
6:p. 22)
The forecast error rates, using the ACOL methods, were
less than six percent for 26 of the 31 communities. Those
communities where the error rate exceeded six percent
generally had large numbers of lateral transfers and/or year
group designation changes. Because they can have large
fluctuations from year to year, future lateral transfers and
designation changes are difficult to anticipate and to
predict. Prior to this validation, STRAP-O forecasted
inventories with a year group designation. In a year group
designation stocks of personnel are grouped by the fiscal year
they are accessed. This creates forecast errors since
19
personnel will change year groups if promoted early or late,
or if they laterally change from one community to another.
With a year group format, an individual's actual length of
service is not the dimension being modeled. STRAP-O was
changed to use an LOS scheme after the errors using the year
group designation format were discovered. (Ref. 6:p. 24)
G. MODEL USAGE
The STRAP-O model resides at the Argonne National Labora-
tories in Chicago, II. and is linked to the Bureau of Naval
Personnel in Washington D.C. via a modem connection. Only the
personnel from PERS-212, the Officer Plans branch, currently
use the model, and only one person in the branch uses it
actively.
Furthermore, from August 90 through April 91 there have
been only four requests from outside the PERS-21 shop for
STRAP-O information. PERS-212 attributes this lack of use to
the following: 1) the other potential users of the model do
not really know what it can do for them; 2) the yearly
forecast time horizon is not useful to the many people who
must deal with short-term issues; 3) as the year progresses,
the data on personnel stocks become outdated; and 4) it can,
and normally does, take 24 hours to receive STRAP-O output.
A recent STRAP-O request provides, however, an example of
the model's value. A new community is being formed called
acquisition and the Navy would like this community to
eventually have 399 Captains (06's). A major issue involves
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the difficulty and cost of establishing this community.
STRAP-O is being used to determine the required structure and
accessions of LT's and LCDR's needed to support this
community, and how this new community will affect the total
Navy plan given the restrictions of DOPMA.
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III. THE AVIATION CONTINUATION PAY PROGRAM
This thesis uses the STRAP-O model to forecast the
retention behavior of aviators that would result from the
implementation of the Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) Program.
These forecasts are compared to forecasts made in an earlier
study by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), entitled
"Implementation of the Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP)
Program." (Ref. 4] This chapter summarizes the CNA study,
outlines the reasons why the ACP program is replacing the
Aviation Officer Continuation Pay (AOCP) program, discusses
the methodology used by CNA to determine the effectiveness of
the ACP program, and discusses the forecasting results of the
CNA study.
A. DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY OF THE AOCP AND ACP PROGRAMS
Throughout the 1980's there was a persistent, critical
shortage of mid-grade (CAT II) aviators. 3  This mid-grade
period begins at the end of the minimum service requirement
that is incurred upon graduation from flight school. CAT II
aviators are critical because they are required to fill the
department head billets (senior, experienced aviator
positions) in aviation squadrons. The AOCP and ACP programs
3Defined as senior lieutenants and lieutenant commanders
who are between their sixth and eleventh year of service
(YOS), and who have completed their initial squadron tour.
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were designed to help retain these aviators. Monetary
incentives such as the AOCP program have reduced shortages,
but the current AOCP program, instituted in 1981, was proving
to be too restrictive and insufficient to eliminate the
persistent shortages. [Ref. 4:p. 1)
Under the AOCP program, personnel in eligible aviator
communities4 (those with shortages) were entitled to an annual
bonus of $6,000. The bonus was aimed at both pilots and naval
flight officers (NFO's) with contract lengths of either two,
three, or six years. One of the major problems with the AOCP
program was the fact that the contracts were short enough to
allow many aviators who accepted bonuses to leave the Navy
before serving a department head tour. Another problem was
the inflexibility in allocating bonus payments: aviators
received either a $6,000/year bonus or nothing. Also,
$6,000/year is not a very large bonus considering the
opportunities for civilian aviators.
The ACP program differs from the AOCP program in several
ways. First the maximum allowable payment per year for pilots
was increased to $12,000, while a fixed $4,000/yr payment was
available to NFOs. Also the member has the option of taking
50 percent of the total bonus amount in the first payment and
the remaining 50 percent spread equally over the length of the
contract. The Navy can pay lesser amounts to aviators in
4The subcommunities and associated aircraft types are
listed in Appendix B.
23
communities with smaller shortages, and greater amounts to
aviators in communities with larger shortages, so long as the
annual maximum of $12,000 is not exceeded. The length of a
contract under ACP was increased to cover from the point an
individual accepts the bonus through YOS 14. This ensures
that these aviators will stay in the service long enough to
complete a department head tour. Currently, one- and two-year
contracts are still available under the ACP program and are
targeted primarily at training command instructors. This is
to entice them to remain on active duty until the end of their
initial shure tour so that training command needs are met.
However, these shorter contract lengths will be phased out
since the minimum service requirement incurred at the
completion of flight training has been lengthened from four
years to seven years. Finally, note that only a total of $30
million per year can be spent on the ACP program. This thesis
focuses on how best to implement this new program to meet
expected future shortfalls.
B. METHODOLOGY OF THE CNA STUDY
CNA's analysis of the ACP program focused on the manner in
which the cumulative continuation rate (CCR) is calculated.
The CCR for the ACP represents the percentage of aviators who
are currently eligible to leave the Navy that the Navy must
try to retain through YOS 11 in order to fulfill department
head requirements (number of department head billets divided
by the stocks of personnel between YOS 6 and 11).
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The cCR for the AOCP was calculated by looking at the
entire inventory of aviators by community. Included in this
rate are all aviators from YOS 3 to YOS 14. (Prior to YOS 3 is
flight school.)
The CNA study only considered aviators eligible to leave
military service in determining the ACP continuation rates.
Therefore, the CNA study only examined the stock of aviators
in the YOS range 6 to 11. Calculated this way, the CCR
reflects the continuation rate that must be achieved from
within the group of aviators eligible to leave the military to
meet future department head requirements. The objective of
the ACP program is to increase the continuation rate of
aviators in this group.
CNA's methodology employed five basic steps: (Ref. 4:p.
3]
1. It determined the required overall continuation rate
from YOS 6 to YOS 11 by taking the ratio of the annual
requirements for department heads (at YOS 11) to the
average inventory (at YOS 6);
2. It adjusted the baseline (current) continuation rate for
any forecasted changes in conditions such as the number
of pilots hired by civilian airlines;
3. It subtracted the forecasted baseline continuation rate
from the required contlnued rate to determine the
percentage-point change .n the continuation rate needed
to meet requirements;
4. It used statistical estimates of the relationship
between pay and retention, using data collected from the
AOCP, to calculate the cost of increasing the
continuation rate by 1 percentage-point. Multiply this
cost times the percentage-point change in the
continuation rate needed to meet requirements to
determine the required additional cost;
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5. Finally, the additional estimated increase in the bonus
was added to the current bonus to determine the total
required bonus;
The implementation of the above methodology required
detailed information about the future supply and demand for
aviators. [Ref. 4:p. 4] The data requirements are listed
below:
a. Requirements, in the early 1990s, by subcommunity and
designator for department heads and other lieutenant
commanders (CAT II's);
b. Inventories of year groups approaching bonus eligi-
bility;
c. A baseline (current) continuation rate;
d. Statistical estimates of the effect of pay and other
factors on aviation retention;Each of these data
requirements are discussed below:
1. Requirements
The purpose of the ACP program is to retain enough
aviators to fulfill CAT II requirements. These requirements
are determined by the Manpower and Training Branch of the
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare, N-889) and
are listed in CAT I/II Aircrew Experience Mix and Reguired
Cumulative Continuation Rates by Subcommunitv, Naval Aviation
Management Series, Revision 4-88, 15 July 1988.
Several modifications are made to the numbers from
this document to facilitate the bonus determinations: 1)
first, all bonus takers may not be promoted and some may not
be qualified to fill a department head billet [Ref. 4:p. 5]
2) therefore, requirements are increased ten percent to allow
for a department head selection rate of 90 percent. This
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TABLE 1. AVERAGE ANNUAL CAT II BILLET REQUIREMENTS







VQ JET a 7.6
VP 99.5 51.6
VQ PROP b 8.9




Source: *Adapted from Implementation of the Aviation Continuation Pay
(ACP) Program [ Ref. 4)j
a. Combined with VS pilots.
b. Combined with VP pilots.
selectivity provides the required number of future department
heads plus 10 percent for a quality screen. Some pilot
subcommunities are combined in the analysis of requirements
and inventories. The combined subcommunities are: (a) VS and
VQ JET; (b) VP, VQ TAC, and VQ PROP; (c) HS and HM; and (d)
HSL2, HSL60, and HC. Combining subcommunities implies that
pilots in one of the subcommunities can be retrained and used
in another subcommunity as necessary. (Ref. 4:p. 6] Third,
in the VP communities, 60 percent of the CAT II requirements
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are filled by pilots rather than NFOs. According to the
Manpower and Training Branch of the Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations (Air Warfare, N-889) the VP billets for CAT IIs are
divided equally between pilots and NFOs. However, the future
goal the for CAT II requirements is that 60 percent are filled
by pilots. The annual requirements used in determining the
implementation plan are shown in Table 1.
2. Inventories
TABLE 2. AVERAGE YEAR GROUP INVENTORY, AS OF
SEPTEMBER, 1986, FOR PILOTS AND NFOS IN
YEAR GROUPS 1982-84






VQ JET a 12.7
VP 105.7 121.0
VQ PROP b 13.7




Source: *Adapted from Implementation of the Aviation Continuation Pay
(ACP) Program [Ref. 4:p. 7]
a. Combined with VS pilots.
b. Combined with VP pilots.
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Inventories are based on year groups, which roughly
correspond to years of service. [Ref. 4:p. 7] The size of
each year group varies widely, so using the inventory from a
single year would cause wild fluctuations in bonus amounts.
Also, in about 1993, the first cohort of aviators eligible for
the ACP program will begin filling department head billets.
Individuals from year groups 1982-84 will be used to fill
these billets. Thus, the average inventory of these three
year groups represents a practical and realistic approximation
to represent the available stocks of personnel. These stocks
were determined as of the end of fiscal year 1988. Table 2
shows the average inventories for year groups 1982 through
1984 [Ref. 4:p. 7].
3. Continuation Rates
The baseline overall continuation rate is an estimate
of the probability that an aviator at YOS 6 will survive to
YOS 11 under current conditions (including the current AOCP
bonus effects on continuation). The standard methodology used
to determine the baseline continuation rate is to multiply the
continuation rates for the populations in each length of
service (LOS) cell (those between YOS 6 and YOS 11) for that





Where: C~t ffi Continuation rate to LOS cell n from
LOS cell n-1.
The continuation rate for FY 88 is determined from the
remaining populations of year groups 1977 through 1982 in FY
88 (i.e., LOS 6 is YG 82, LOS 7 is YG 81, LOS 8 is YG 80, LOS
9 is YG 79, LOS 10 is YG 78, LOS 11 is YG 77).
With the change from AOCP to ACP, there is an
important institutional change. Under AOCP, aviators at YOS
6 or 7 could take a 3- or 4-year contract and still leave
before completing YOS 11 [Ref. 4:p. 9]. In FY 84 a number of
jet pilots took a four-year bonus and when they completed this
TABLE 3. REQUIRED CONTINUATION RATES OF PILOTS
AND NFOS BY SUBCOMMUNITY (IN PERCENT)






VQ JET a 60.0
VP 48.4 42.1
VQ PROP b 65.3




Source: *Adapted from Implementation of the Aviation
Continuation Pay (ACP) Program (Ref. 4]
a. Combined with VS pilots.
b. Combined with VP pilots.
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obligation in FY 88, left the Navy prior to serving in a
department head billet. Under the ACP program, this cannot
occur because aviators are obligated through LOS 14 [Ref. 4:p.
9).
In devising the ACP implementation plan, a modified
form of the computation of the CCR, which accounts for the
differences between the AOCP and ACP programs, replaces the
standard CCR methodology. The modified CCR is 90 percent of
TABLE 4. ACTUAL AND MODIFIED CCR'S BY SUBCOMMUNITY
FOR PILOTS AND NFO0S
Pi lots UFO's
Subcammanity Actual lodified Actual Modified
VAL/VFA 32.8 /,9.1 n/a n/a
VAN 27.4 37.0 73.7 73.7
VF 24.9 40.8 50.0 63.3
VAQ 19.2 34.6 74.7 74.7
Vs 19.3 23.2 63.3 74.0
VC JET 27.0 40.7 66.0 79.9
VP 26.6 35.3 61.3 66.8
VO PROP 25.0 33.9 47.4 51.3
VQ TAC 25.0 29.3 59.6 79.7
VAW 18.9 27.3 59.6 62.2
HSL/HC 53.0 57.8 n/a n/s
HS/HN 54.3 67.3 n/a n/a
Source: *Adapted from Implementation of the Aviation
Continuation Pay (ACP) Program [Ref. 4]
a. Combined with VS pilots.
b. Combined with VP pilots.
the product of the continuation rates at YOS 6 through YOS 8
in FY 88. The calculation for the Modified CCR is:
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Modified CCR = 0.90 * (CR 6 * CR 7 * CRLO 8 )
Where: CRO 6 = Continuation rate from LOS 5 to LOS 6
CR• s = Continuation rate from LOS 6 to LOS 7
CRLs a- Continuation rate from LOS 7 to LOS 8
The undeilying assumption in calculating the modified CCR is
that the decision to take an ACP contract is made sometime
between LOS 6 and LOS 8. The modified CCR accounts for only
90 percent of continuation beyond this initial decision point
to account for other types of attrition due to factors such as
accidents, groundings, and lateral transfers. Also, the
modified CCR (from the 6 to 8 LOS point) cannot be lower than
the actual CCR (from the 6 to 11 LOS point). 5 If the actual
CCR is lower than the modified CCR, the modified CCR is set
equal to the actual CCR [Ref. 4:p. 10]. Table 3 shows the
cumulative continuation rates of pilots and NFO's necessary to
meet requirements. Table 4 shows the actual and modified CCRs
for each subcommunity determined by CNA as of 1988.
4. Statistical Estimates
The relationship between bonuses, pay, other economic
factors, and continuation rates has been estimated using data
collected from the AOCP program. [Ref. 4:p. 11] A logit
econometric (Annuaiized Cost-of-Leaving) model was used by CNA
to estimate the effect of bonuses on the continuation rate.
The estimated logit coefficients are shown in Table 5.
These coefficients do not directly indicate the effect of the
5By "Actual CCR" we mean the CCR estimate computed as
described at the start of this section on continuation rates.
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TABLE 5. ESTIMATED LOGIT COEFFICIENTS USED TO FORECAST







Jet -. 054 -. 013
Prop -. 067 -. 013





Source: *Adapted from Implementation of the Aviation
Continuation Pay (ACP) Program
variable on the continuation rate but instead indicate the
change in the continuation rate resulting from a $1,000
increase in pay. The three basic variables are: relative
military and civilian pay (Milciv Pay), civilian hiring
rates, 6 and the annual unemployment rate of males age 20 and
over. Through the use of interactive dummy variables, the
separate effect of each explanatory variable on continuation
is estimated for each of the three classes of aircraft. The
6For the analysis for Navy pilots, CNA used the rate at which
domestic airlines were hiring new pilots. For the analysis for
NFO's CNA used the rate at which civilian firms were hiring
engineers of all types.
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table shows the combined effect of the basic variable and the
interactive dummy variable for the specific aircraft type
(Ref. 4:p. 11].
5. Forecasts
A major source of uncertainty in this methodology is
the future economic condition. An unexpected contraction or
expansion of civilian employment could lead to underestimates
or overestimates of separation behavior. Planners need to
monitor economic conditions and be prepared to change bonus
levels when there are major changes in conditions. [Ref. 4:p.
14] Although the statistical estimates shown in Table 5 make
it possible to adjust the baseline continuation rates for
changes in economic conditions, they assume a relatively
stable environment. Recognizing these limitations, the
following predictions of ACP effectiveness were made by CNA.
In general, given the size of the coefficients of the
Milciv variable, pilots are more sensitive to pay changes than
NFO's, and Jet pilots are slightly more sensitive to pay
changes than Prop or Helo pilots. The less sensitive that
continuation rates are to changes in pay, the more expensive
it is to fix. Other things being equal, NFO bonuses would
have to be about four times as large as pilot bonuses to have
the same effect on the continuation rate. The relatively high
cost of increasing NFO continuation makes it impractical to
attack NFO shortages with bonuses. (Bonuses are offered to
NFOs in communities with shortages because both pilot and NFO
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face the same risks and to offer a bonus only to pilots would
create morale problems). Other actions are therefore required
to deal with NFO shortages. [Ref. 4:p. 12]
Given the above inferences about the effects of a
bonus on aviator retention, an allocation rule was developed
for determining the award levels for the various subcommun-
ities. The rule takes into account the relative shortages
between the subcommunities, and can be stated as follows:
For any pairwise comparison of subcommunities, the one
with the larger projected shortage (after accounting for
the bonus) receives the larger bonuses. [Ref. 4:p. 19]
Table 6 shows the bonus amounts for each year of obligation by
subcommunity for pilots and NFO's (determined by the above
allocation rule) that were used in projecting the number of
bonus takers in CNA's study. The variability in bonus
payments (varying the bonus amount given to different aviation
subcommunities based on actual shortages) will provide better
future estimates of the pay elasticity7 of aviators.
Column 2 of Table 7 shows the number of ACP contracts
predicted by the CNA study, and Column 1 show the number
actually attained in FY 1989 while Column 3 shows the percent
error in CNA's predictions.
The large increase in the bonuses available in some
subcommunities under the ACP bonus program is outside the
range of experience with previous bonus programs (since some
7The pay elasticity in this study is the ratio of the percent
change in the continuation rate for a one percent change in the
bonus amount.
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TABLE 6. SUGGESTED ANNUAL AWARD LEVELS BY







VQ JET 10,000 0
VP 8,000 0
VQ PROP 8,000 4,000




Source: *Adapted from Implementation of the Aviation
Continuation Pay (ACP) Program [Ref. 4)
*These annual bonus amounts are multiplied by the
number of years an aviator agrees to remain on
active duty up to the 14th YOS.
communities have never been offered a bonus before), which may
have led to the high forecast errors. Also, the Navy manages
aviators on the subcommunity level instead of on the more
aggregated jet, propeller, and helocopter community level used
in this study and many of the subcommunities are quite small
in size. The smaller the cohort the more difficult it is to
provide accurate forecasts because of continuation rates the
decisions of a small number of individuals can cause a
significant forecast error. (Ref. 4:p. 40]
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TABLE 7. ACP CONTRACTS ATTAINED AND PREDICTED
FOR FOCUS YEAR GROUPS BY SUBCOMMUNITY
(1) (2) (3)
Subcommunity Attained Predicted %error
a. Pilots
VAL/VFA 22 31 40.9
VAM 17 12 -29.4
VF 9 17 88.9
VAQ 2 3 50.0
VS 8 8 0.0
VP 65 92 41.5
VAW 11 15 36.4
HSL/HC 85 103 21.2
HS/HM 43 64 48.8
b. NFO's
VF 25 40 60.0
VAQ 19 35 84.2
VQ 14 20 42.9
VAW 13 26 100.0
Source: *Adapted from Implementation of the Aviation
Continuation Pay (ACP) Program
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
This chapter explains the use of the STRAP-O model to
predict the retention behavior of aviators using the ACP bonus
award levels suggested in the CNA study for pilots. [Ref. 4]
However, the actual bonus amount awarded NFO's was $6,000/year
so this value was used for this study for NFO's. The method-
ology used in this thesis follows as closely as possible that
used in the CNA study. However, it is not the intent of this
thesis to redo, validate, or refute the results obtained from
the CNA study. The CNA study simply provides a vehicle to
exercise the STRAP-O model. The predicted number of bonus
takers from the STRAP-Q analysis can be compared to those
obtained in the CNA study, as well as to actual number of
bonus takers for FY 1989.
A. ENVIRONMENT
In order to duplicate the actual manpower environment in
1989, it was necessary to enter into STRAP-O the manpower
policy constraints that existed at the end of Fiscal 1988.
These policies must be in place to allow the ORFM and OPRO
modules to adjust loss rate calculations to reflect the same
environment that existed in Fiscal 1988. The environment
included the constraints on promotion opportunities, promotion
zones, and flow points. The STRAP-O default scenario for 1988
was recalled from the archives at Argonne; in addition, data
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obtained from the Officer Personnel Information System (OPIS)
and the Fiscal Year 1989 promotion plan were entered into
STRAP-O.
1. Promotion Opportunity
The STRAP-O model can use promotion opportunities that
it generates itself (in meeting target end strengths) or those
entered by the user. Two types of promotion opportunities are
needed by STRAP-O. First, the overall promotion opportunities
by pay grade must be established. For example, if the promo-
tion opportunity to lieutenant commander (LCDR) is 80 percent,
then STRAP-O will promote 80 percent of the total eligible
lieutenants (LT) to LCDR. The promotion opportunities, by pay
grade, for FY 1989 are shown in Table 8.
TABLE S. PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES (PERCENT) BY PAY GRADE





However, historically, rates of promotion within the
various subcommunities have differed from each other. There-
fore, promotion rates within the individual communities are
needed to run the model. These are entered by the user and
are based on the historical (past three years) average promo-
tion experience. For example, the average promotion rate of
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jet pilot LT to LCDR, for FY 86-88, was 87.66 percent, while
the overall promotion rate was only 80 percent. The
subcommunity-specific promotion rates were obtained from OPIS
and averaged for FY 86-88. They are listed in Table 9.
TABLE 9. PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES FOR PILOTS BY
SUBCOMMUNITIES (IN %)
Subcommunity LCDR CDR CAPT
PILOTS
JET 87.7 77.5 57.2
PROP 82.9 69.4 54.2
HELO 83.2 76.3 48.9
NFOs
JET 81.9 72.9 54.8
PROP 85.2 65.4 49.1
Source: OPIS
2. Flow Points
Other policy variables required by STRAP-O are the
desired flow points. A flow point is the expected point in an
individual's career at which a particular rank is actually
achieved. This determines how quickly personnel flow through
the system. Flow points are identical across all subcommun-
ities by paygrade since they are controlled by the Bureau of
Naval Personnel. Flow points are expressed in years and
months of active service. The flow points entered into STRAP-
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O were obtained from the FY 89 promotion plan and are shown in
Table 10.
TABLE 10. FY 89 PROMOTION PLAN FLOW POINTS BY PAY GRADE
(YEARS-MONTHS)






The YOS point of athe bottom of a promotion zone
determines the number of people who come before a particular
promotion board. For the year in question, the promotion zone
is defined by the length of active service (years and months)
of the most junior eligible personnel. These data were
obtained from the FY 89 promotion plan and are shown in Table
11.
TABLE 11. FY 89 PROMOTION PLAN ZONE BOTTOMS
(YEARS-MONTHS) BY PAY GRADE







The methodology employed in using STRAP-O to determine the
effects of the ACP program on aviator retention differed from
the CNA study in several ways. First, the size of the bonus
used to generate the STRAP-O forecasts of NFOs was $6,000 per
year (which was the actual award level) not the $4,000 per
year suggested in the CNA study. Second, the VS, VQ JET, VQ
TAC, and VQ PROP subcommunities were excluded from this study.
Because these subcommunities are very small, contain multiple
aircraft types or members with very different missions,
individuals in these groups are not expected to behave the
same across the entire subcommunity.
The STRAP-O forecasting methodology involved the following
six-step process:
1. Determine a baseline (no bonus) continuation rate and
number of survivors, for each subcommunity, to YOS 8 and
YOS 11;
2. Inject the applicable bonus amount, as a percent of base
pay, at YOS 6 and forecast the expected change in
continuation rates to YOS 7;
3. Calculate the increase in the number of officers
predicted to survive to YOS 8 after the bonus is
applied;
4. Calculate the difference between the bonus, and no-bonus
forecasts, at YOS 8. This is the number of additional
officers retained by the ACP bonus;
5. Add these additional officers to the no-bonus stock of
personnel at YOS 11;
6. Compare the STRAP-O and CNA projections, and then




An initial, baseline forecast was made with STRAP-O
that assumes no changes in pay. From this, the cumulative
continuation rates from YOS 6 (the approximate end of the
initial obligation) to YOS 8 and YOS 11 for each of the five
aviation subcommunities in STRAP-O (pilot jet/prop/helo and
NFO jet/prop) were determined. These continuation rates were
then applied to the average annual inventories, for each
community listed in Table 2 for year groups 1982-1984. The
baseline (no-bonus) stocks of personnel at YOS 8 and YOS 11
determined by this process are shown in Table 12.
TABLE 12. BASELINE STOCKS OF PERSONNEL PREDICTED
BY STRAP-O AT YOU 8 AND 11 FOR EACH




















2. Applying the Bonus
STRAP-0 does not allow the direct application of a
one-time lump sum monetary payment. All changes in pecuniary
benefits must be in terms of a percent change in base pay.
Therefore, the Net Present Value (NPV) of the bonus,
discounted at 10 percent, was converted to a percentage of
base pay and applied at YOS 6. The following payment stream
was used to calculate the NPV of the ACP bonus for an NFO:
Assume NFOs have 6 years of active duty (Pilots 6.5 years
since pilots have a longer training period) when they
become eligible for the ACP program and accept the 50%
lump sum bonus option (The other payment option is to
accept the bonus amount every year, i.e., 6,000/year for
seven years). At $6,000/year this equates to a payment
stream of $21,000 in the first year and $3,500/year for
each of the next 6 years. This payment stream, discounted
at 10 percent, has a NPV of $36,243 at the start of the
obligation period.
NPV-36,243-$21000+t ($3.500/1.1SUPn)
The base pay figure was determined for an 0-3 (LT)
with over 6 years of active service, including flight pay.
Using the pay scales in effect 1 JAN 89 this yielded a total
base pay of $29,608.
Thus with the NPV of the bonus, the pilot's equivalent
pay for the first year of the bonus contract would be $29,608
+ $36,243 = $65,851. This represents a 122% pay increase for
this year.
The NPV of the bonus is applied as a one-time payment
because once the decision is made to accept the bonus, the
bonus taker is obligated through YOS 14. The decision to
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accept the bonus must be made at the value of the bonus when
it is accepted. The no-bonus continuation rates from YOS 6 to
YOS 8 and YOS 11, and the continuation rates from YOS 6 to YOS
8 with the bonus are listed in Table 13. The listings are in
terms of pilots (JET, PROP, HELO) and NFOs (JET, PROP). As
can be seen in Table 13, the large bonus payments have driven
the continuation rates to 1.00 except for HELO pilots and JET
NFOs. Note that there were two different bonus levels in the
jet pilot and helicopter pilot subcommunities, depending on
specific aircraft type.
3. Bonus Takers
The term bonus takers includes those personnel who
remain due to the bonus, as well as, those personnel who would
have stayed without the bonus. This thesis makes the
assumption that anyone intending to remain in the service
through their department head tour will take the bonus. Given
this assumption, the number of actual bonus takers will
represent, fairly well, the stocks of available personnel to
fill department head billets. People who do not take a bonus
or who take a short-term bonus are not expected to be
available for department head tours.
Since the decision to accept the bonus can be made
only once, the increase in the continuation rate through YOS
7 determines the additional personnel retained as a result of
the ACP bonus. Therefore, the numb : of additional personnel
who survive through YOS 7 to arrive at YOS 8 are the
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additional bonus takers retained by the ACP bonus. This is
calculated by taking the difference between the bonus and no-
bonus forecasts of personnel stocks at YOS 8. Table 14 shows
the forecasted number of bonus takers.
TABLE 13. NO-BONUS AND BONUS CONTINUATION RATES
FORECASTED BY STRAP-O FOR PILOTS AND
NFOs
No-Bonus Bonus
Bonus amount by YOS 8 YOS 11 YOS 8
Suboommunity YOS 8 _YOSII YOS_8
JET PILOT .7134 .3402
$12,000 1.00
10,000 1.00
PROP PILOT .5709 .3189
8,000 1.00
HELO PILOT .8661 .5542
7,000 .9901
6,000 .9891
JET NFO .8971 .5911
6,000 .9886




TABLE 14. PREDICTED ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL RETAINED
DUB TO THE ACP BONUS (USING STRAP-O)
Forecasted
community Bonus Takers % Increase over














C. REQUIREMENTS VS. FORECASTS
The forecasted number of additional bonus takers are added
to the no-bonus forecast of the YOS 11 stocks of personnel.
This becomes the pool of available personnel to fill depart-
ment head billets, starting around YOS 11. Table 15 shows the
pool of available personnel to fill department head billets as
forecasted by STRAP-O, and by the CNA study; the actual number
of bonus takers through 1989; and the actual requirements from
the Manpower and Training branch of the Assistant Chief of
Naval Operations (Air Warfare, N-889).
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TABLE 15. PREDICTED STOCKS OF AVAILABLE PERSONNEL




Cmaros ty STRAP-O elA (%err) Takors RaIai reints
(1Z err)
VAL/VFA 51 (t)2) 31 (41) 22 53
VAN 23 (35) 12 (-29) 17 22
VF 36 300) 17 (89) 9 33
VAQ 9 (50) 3 (50) 2 11
VP 79 (22) 92 (42) 65 99
VAW 21 (91) 15 (36) 11 13
HS/HM 44 (2) 64 (49) 43 52
HSL/HC 105 (24) 103 (21) 85 121
b. NF(w
FORECASTS ACTUAL
Cammity STRAP-O OIA (Z err) Takers ROcir efts
(% err)
VAQ 31 (24) 35 (40) 25 33
VF 43 (231) 40 (208) 13 40
VAW 27 (42) 26 (37) 19 25
Source: Author
D. AN EXAMPLE: VAQ NFOs
The following is an example of the results of this
methodology applied to VAQ NFOs for the target year groups
1982-1984:
The baseline continuation rates to YOS 8 and 11 estimated
by STRAP-O are .8971 and .5911, respectively. These
continuation rates are applied to the average annual
inventory obtained from Table 2 of 44.7 VAQ NFOs in the
target year groups. From this average 40.1 NFOs survive
to YOS 8 and 26.42 NFOs survive to YOS 11 in the baseline
case.
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"* The NPV of the award level for VAQ NFOs is $36,243 and
this equates to a 122 percent increase in basepay. This
increase is applied at YOS 6 and the retention rate to YOS
8 is forecasted by STRAP-O to be .9886. Therefore, the
forecasted number of survivors to YOS 8 are 44.19.
"• The difference between the forecasted, bonus and no-bonus
stock at YOS 8 is 4.09.
" These additional survivors are then added to the no-bonus
YOS 11 stock to yield 30.51 officers. This is the pool of
VAQ NFOs, forecasted by STRAP-O, available to meet
department head requirements, from the target year groups
due to the ACP bonus.
"This forecasted pool of personnel are then compared to the
annual requirements, tc determine if a shortfall exists.
The annual requirement for VAQ NFOs is 32.9, yielding a
forecasted shortfall of 1.79. The actual shortfall is 8
NFOs (Actual takers minus requirements) as shown in Table
15.
E. RESULTS
For pilots, as shown in Table 15, the forecasted pool of
available personnel at YOS 11 was overestimated by both STRAP-
O and the CNA study in almost all cases compared to the actual
number of bonus takers. However, although the CNA study over-
estimated the actual stock, CNA concluded that the shortfall
of personnel would remain in all communities with the
suggested ACP bonus award levels. The forecasts that STRAP-0
makes for pilots indicate that for the majority of subcom-
munities requirements will be met with the suggested bonus
award levels. The conclusions drawn from the STRAP-O
predictions would lead policy makers in many cases to decrease
the bonus amounts, exacerbating the shortages.
For NFOs, the predictions from STRAP-O and the CNA study
were essentially similar. The predictions overestimated the
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stock and predicted that there would be no shortages. It was
noted in the CNA study, however, that very little was known
concerning the pay elasticity for NFOs and it was expected
that the bonus would have very little effect on the retention
rates of these personnel.
CNA's estimates of retention had smaller errors than the
STRAP-O estimates due to more recent data as well as data that
was taken directly from a current bonus environment. The
econometric parameters in STRAP-O were not derived to forecast
the effects of a large, one-time, bonus payment. Also, as can
be seen from the large variation in percentage error between
subcommunities, large differences in behavior between commun-
ities lead to the conclusion that aggregating all aviators by
jet, prop, or helo does not make a good substitute for making
separate forecasts proxy for the small population subcommun-
ities. The small cohort size of each subcommunity has caused
significant error in the forecasts.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis addressed the issue of the Aviation bonus and
its effects on retention simply as a vehicle to exercise
STRAP-O on a real world, tactical problem. It was not the
intention of this study to redo, validate, or refute the
results obtained in CNA's study, Imnlementation of the
Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) Program. This thesis makes a
comparison between STRAP-O forecasts, an independent study and
real world results. These results are contained in the Table
15. The STRAP-O forecast's show large errors for VF NFO's and
all Jet Pilot communities except for YAM. STRAP-a treats all
Jet Pilots as one community and all Jet NFO's as one
community, but the varying error rates show that communities
behave independently. It could also be concluded from these
results that VAM pilots are more satisfied with their
community than other Jet Pilots and VF NFO's less satisfied
than other Jet NFO's with their communities.
In general the stocks of available personnel to fill
department head billets are overestimated by the STRAP-O
model. For NFO's, STRAP-O and CNA compare well with each
other but grossly overestimate the actual number of NFO bonus
takers. For pilots, the STRAP-O estimates of the numbers of
bonus takers are much higher than the CNA estimates, except in
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the case of VP pilots. However, compared with the actual
bonus takers both sets of estimates are too high.
The predictions of STRAP-O substantially overestimate the
actual aviation continuation rates. The main reason for this
is the long period of time that has elapsed since the econo-
metric parameters of the ORF74 module of STRAP-O have been
updated. These parameters have not been updated since 1984.
This module is not employed in practice and according to NPRDC
this study is the first time OFRM has been used in an actual
application. This study has found the parameters to be so
inaccurate that ORFM was unable to provide reliable estimates
of the effect of pay changes on the continuation rates for the
aviation sub-communities of pilots (jet/prop/helo) and NFO's
(jet/prop). However, in all fairness, the magnitude of some
of the pay changes are well beyond the sensitivity intendeO in
the original design of STRAP-O. This is why the STRAP-O
estimates of retention rates where driven to 1.0 for pilots
(JET/PROP) and .9886 for NFOs (JET). With these high
retention rates almost the total beginning inventory of Jet
NFO's and the entire beginning inventory of Jet Pilots were
expected to accept the ACP bonus and remain in service, but
this was not borne out by the real world experience.
The Officer Goals (OGOALS) module is currently inopera-
tive, so strength targets are manually entered into a default
scenario. It is not known if the OGOALS module has ever been
employed.
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The Accessions Into Designators (AIDS) module has never
been applied to real a world problem. It has only been used
in demonstrations and there are few outside of NPRDC who even
know what AIDS does.
OGOALS has fallen into disarray because of lack of use.
AIDS is not used and ORFM ha6 not been updated because there
has been no demand for it. This lack of use is why Navy has
a strategic planning model that is employed using only one of
its four modules.
OPRO used in this solo fashion is strictly a naive fore-
casting tool. It has no ability to adjust for external
economic factors nor for varying internal strength targets.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
As a long range strategic planning tool, STRAP-O can
provide the policy maker with a method of examining various
policy alternatives for their future implications. However,
in today's rapidly changing, uncertain manpower world,
strategic planning often gives way to tactical planning. The
following recommendations are provided in an attempt to
increase the use of STRAP-O by Navy manpower planners:
1. Usability
STRAP-O must provide manpower planners with a tool
that provides answers to the questions they must ask. Without
the ability to make forecasts for periods of less than one
year and a data base that is updated at least monthly, STRAP-O
will continue to be under-utilized or completely ignored.
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The difficulty of entering data into STRAP-O is one
major reason for its lack of use. Because it resides on a
main frame computer many potential users are intimidated. The
current front end of STRAP-O requires the user to move through
the main frame environment to update plans and input the
policy changes being examined. For example, at the start of
this study the pay change pages in the Officer Retention
Forecasting Module (ORFM) could not be used. There are 9
pages of pay changes (pages 200-208) that can be entered (up
to 9 different pay changes can be input per run). However,
the way the source code was written, if page 200 was not
activated then no other page was read by the program. The
contractor fixed this problem and said that they had no idea
why the code was written that way. After the contractor
modified the program, only page 200 would work. It was
decided to leave the program alone at this point since with
one page the model runs could be accomplished one at a time.
Problems like this are frustrating, which lead novice computer
users to find other means to solve their problems.
STRAP-O output is also very unwieldy. For a model
designed to allow the user to quickly evaluate a series of
"what if" questions, a large amount of paper is generated. In
the course of this study a stack of paper over a foot and a
half high as created. Each run produces a set of output
three quarters of an inch thick. However, the few numbers
required from each run are all contained on one page. The
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user should have some control over the amount of output. This
would be especially important in a PC version of STRAP-O that
is not linked to a speedy, high volume laser printer.
It has been suggested that STRAP-0 be disaggregated to
allow separate runs for specific communities. This defeats
the whole purpose of the STRAP-O model. Since the Navy
manpower pie is fixed by DOPMA restrictions, no community can
be altered without having some implications for other
communities. The current model configuration provides the
means to keep tabs on what happens to the whole Navy plan as
individual community problems are addressed.
Another serious problem is that the data base used by
STRAP-O must be updated more frequently then once a year.
Without very accurate personnel stocks, budgetary estimates
could be substantially inaccurate and this could cause serious
problems at the end of the fiscal year. For this reason at
least a quarterly update is required, and a monthly update
would be ideal.
2. Develop a PC Version of STRAP-O
Presently the idea of creating a PC version of STRAP-O
is being discussed in BUPERS. The STRAP-O model consists of
10,000 lines of code. With the advent of the 486 computer
chip, a program of this size could easily be accommodated. A
PC-version would make real time analysis of policy questions
a reality. This would also allow for greater exploration of
the tactical options STRAP-O may be able to provide.
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In the process of moving STRAP-O to the PC, a user-
friendly menu system must be designed which allows a user with
no computer knowledge to setup and run the model and to inter-
pret the output. If the functions of STRAP-O that are not
presently being used continue to lie dormant, they should not
be incorporated into the PC-version of the model. Specifi-
cally, since the accession process for officers has such a
long lead time (4 years), is there really a need for an
accession source planning module (i.e., AIDS)?
Currently, the Navy Officer Personnel Planning System
(NOPPS) is the tool relied upon to deal with both the tactical
and the strategic issues faced by the Officer Plans and Career
Management Division (PERS-21). STRAP-O and NOPPS used
together could be very effective as a team but the two models
must be designed to interact. Unless STRAP-O can demonstrate
a tactical application, NOPPS will continue to be the tool
used to solve short term problems. The potential long range
problems from these short term solutions may not be expected
or planned for. If a PC version of STRAP-O cannot interact





GURL (General Unrestricted Line)
SURFACE
NUC SURF (Nuclear Surface)
NUC SUB (Nuclear Submarine)
GEN SUB (General Submarine)
SPEC WAR (Special Warfare)
SPEC OPS (Special Operations)







EDO (Engineering Duty Officer)
AEDO (Aviation Engineering Duty Officer)
AMDO (Aviation Maintenance Duty Officer)
CRYPTO
INTELL




MED SERV (Medical Service Officer)




CEC (Civil Engineering Corps)
LDO LINE (Limited Duty Officer Line)
LDO SUPPLY (Limited Duty Officer Supply)
LDO CEC (Limited Duty Officer CEC)
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APPENDIX B
SUBCOMOUNITY AND AIRCRAFT TYPE
Subcommunity Aircraft Type
VAL/VFA A-7, AV-8, F/A-18, F-16
VAM A-6, A-12




VP P-3A/B, P-3C, VXP
VQ PROP EP-3





HC U/HH-3, E/U/HH-46, CH-53E
HM R/MH-53D/E, CH-53
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